As of March 17, 2010, the ConocoPhillips Energy Prize is open for submissions.
Submit an Entry
About the Prize
The ConocoPhillips Energy Prize is a joint initiative of ConocoPhillips and Penn State to recognize new ideas and original, actionable solutions that can help improve the way the nation develops and uses energy.
In 2010, the program will award up to $300,000 in cash prizes to further the development of innovative ideas and solutions in three areas:
Developing new energy sources, including new ways to develop alternative energy.
Improving energy efficiency, such as new methods to significantly reduce the amount of energy consumed in the United States.
Combating climate change, including solutions that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
By creating an open forum for new energy ideas, we can create a path to a more secure and environmentally conscious energy future.
How it Works
Participants have until May 21, 2010, to submit their entries. See the complete program rules and entry details.
A qualified panel of expert judges will select up to five finalists – individuals or teams – to present their submissions in October. Submissions will be judged on the basis of creativity, scalability, commercial viability and sustainability.
Finalists will initially receive $25,000 to help further develop their concepts. The winner will receive an additional $100,000, the first runner-up will receive an additional $50,000, and the second runner-up will receive an additional $25,000.
KEY DATES
May 21, 2010 -- Entries due
August 2010 -- Finalists announced
October 2010 -- Awards event
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Cameron’s Camera
Avatar’s creator hopes to direct the first movies shot on Mars.
By Tony Reichhardt
airspacemag.com, March 23, 2010
The day after he won two Golden Globes for making the top-grossing film of all time, Avatar director James Cameron was in the NASA Administrator’s office, describing the scene he’d really like to shoot:
“The camera is looking down at the Mars rover,” recalls Mike Ravine, who was in the meeting. “You can see the sample arm off to one side, and we pan up and see Mars in front of us. We’re rolling slowly along the surface. We pan back slowly so we see Mars going by, then look back at the tracks of the rover going off to the horizon behind us—in 3-D.”
As Cameron talked, Ravine looked around at the faces of the gathered NASA officials, “and everybody in the room was nodding, clearly thinking, “Oh, yeah.”
Now the developers of the Mastcam camera for the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), NASA’s next Mars rover, are trying to make Cameron’s dream come true. They’re in a race to build a zoom 3-D camera—the kind NASA originally selected for the mission, then scrapped as a cost-cutting measure—in time for its October 2011 launch. Actually, the camera needs to be finished by this December, in time to be tested on the rover. Ravine, Advanced Projects Manager at Malin Space Science Systems, the San Diego-based company building the camera, says it’s doable, but just barely. “The first thing I think of when I wake up every morning is, ‘Oh my god, I wish we had more time.’ ”
Restoring the zoom capability would allow the camera to take wide-angle, 3-D video from a perspective comparable to what a person would see walking around Mars. Cameron is included as a co-investigator for Mastcam, which is unusual for a non-scientist. Michael Malin, the camera's principal investigator, invited him to join the project in 2003. Malin knew Cameron through Ravine, who had worked with the director on earlier plans for a commercial moon mission called BlastOff!—forerunner to today’s Google Lunar X-Prize (which Cameron also has an interest in). The director, whose credits include Titanic, the second-highest grossing film ever, has a long association with the real space program, having served on NASA’s Advisory Board and lobbied—unsuccessfully—to fly cameras on the space station.
As a Mastcam co-investigator, he was on track to direct the first movie scenes shot on another planet. Then the MSL, which is larger and more complex than the Spirit and Opportunity rovers now on Mars, ran into money problems. The project’s price tag rose from $1.64 billion to $2.3 billion, and when the costs seemed out of control in 2007, NASA insisted on cuts, one of which was replacing the binocular zoom Mastcam with a simpler instrument that has two “eyes” of fixed, but different, focal lengths. The “descoping” of Mastcam saved about $1.5 million. When work stopped on the zoom version, Ravine figures the camera was about 80 percent complete.
He and his colleagues heaved a sigh and went to work finishing the scaled-down camera, which they recently delivered to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California, NASA’s center in charge of the MSL. But they preserved the option of building a zoom camera by going ahead with the purchase of critical camera parts, including small motors used for the zoom assembly, just in case circumstances changed. And when, in 2008, NASA slipped the MSL launch date two years to 2011, they saw an opportunity.
At the time, Cameron was immersed in making Avatar. But in January of this year, he and Ravine met with NASA Administrator Charles Bolden and other agency officials to make their case for replacing the fixed-focus Mastcam with the original zoom version. There is little risk to NASA. The fixed Mastcam is already built and delivered, and will fly on MSL as planned if the zoom version doesn’t come together in time. But if it does, and if it passes qualification tests without holding up the MSL schedule, it could be swapped onto the rover. The plan has passed preliminary technical reviews, and NASA is paying $5 million to construct the zoom camera, which would cost another $2 million to $3 million to install. “Nobody has promised anything,” says Ravine, but the space agency is “supportive and enthusiastic.”
Ravine says that if the zooming camera flies, there would be only a marginal improvement in Mastcam’s science capabilities, but the cinematic advantage would be great. The cameras on Spirit and Opportunity can’t take images fast enough to produce video. The fixed Mastcams on MSL will have that ability, but only for a small field of view. The zoom would give the public a wide-angle, you-are-there view of Mars exploration.
Cameron, who has filmed with 3-D cameras miles underwater, has said his goal in becoming a co-investigator on Mastcam “was to have the same capability on Mars as I have with the 3-D high definition motion imaging system I developed for deep ocean exploration and motion pictures…And that will allow all of us to accompany the rover on its journey.”
That’s also what motivates Ravine, a planetary geologist by training. He agrees with the NASA project manager who said, after a review of the plan to upgrade Mastcam, “I want my grandkids to be able to see this stuff.”
Monday, April 19, 2010
Spelling
If you know anything about me at all, it should be that I am a herendous speller. Absolutly terrible at the proper placement of letters in words with more than two sylabyles and eight letters.
One of my worst words has been "unfortunately." I seem to always add an extra "n" or "t" needlessly somewhere in the word. But one methode that I have found that works for me in learning to spell my diffiecult words has been breaking these words up into smaller words (even if it isnt the phynetical proper way of doing it.)
"Unfortunately" is a perfect example of this. The proper method liekly involves breaking the word up as follows: "un-fortun-ately." My perosnnel problem, and it is a personal provlem, is I dont even know how to spell fortune (two sylabule, seven letters)/. And the idea that I should drop the "e" and replace it with "ately" drive me stupid.
So here is my retarded method in action: "un-for-tuna-tely." If you read it out load it sounds something like, "one for tuna telly" which sounds like some kind of British or Irish old saying.
"know, what I mean mate? All for one and one for the tuna telly, heh?"
CORRECTED COPY:
If you know anything about me at all, it should be that I am a horrendous speller. Absolutely terrible at the proper placement of letters in words with more than two syllables and eight letters.
One of my worst words has been "unfortunately." I seem to always add an extra "n" or "t" needlessly somewhere in the word. But one method that I have found that works for me in learning to spell my difficult words has been breaking these words up into smaller words (even if it isn’t the phonetically proper way of doing it.)
"Unfortunately" is a perfect example of this. The proper method likely involves breaking the word up as follows: "un-fortun-ately." My personnel problem, and it is a personal problem, is I don’t even know how to spell fortune (two syllable, seven letters)/. And the idea that I should drop the "e" and replace it with "ately" drive me stupid.
So here is my retarded method in action: "un-for-tuna-tely." If you read it out load it sounds something like, "one for tuna telly" which sounds like some kind of British or Irish old saying.
"know, what I mean mate? All for one and one for the tuna telly, heh?"
One of my worst words has been "unfortunately." I seem to always add an extra "n" or "t" needlessly somewhere in the word. But one methode that I have found that works for me in learning to spell my diffiecult words has been breaking these words up into smaller words (even if it isnt the phynetical proper way of doing it.)
"Unfortunately" is a perfect example of this. The proper method liekly involves breaking the word up as follows: "un-fortun-ately." My perosnnel problem, and it is a personal provlem, is I dont even know how to spell fortune (two sylabule, seven letters)/. And the idea that I should drop the "e" and replace it with "ately" drive me stupid.
So here is my retarded method in action: "un-for-tuna-tely." If you read it out load it sounds something like, "one for tuna telly" which sounds like some kind of British or Irish old saying.
"know, what I mean mate? All for one and one for the tuna telly, heh?"
CORRECTED COPY:
If you know anything about me at all, it should be that I am a horrendous speller. Absolutely terrible at the proper placement of letters in words with more than two syllables and eight letters.
One of my worst words has been "unfortunately." I seem to always add an extra "n" or "t" needlessly somewhere in the word. But one method that I have found that works for me in learning to spell my difficult words has been breaking these words up into smaller words (even if it isn’t the phonetically proper way of doing it.)
"Unfortunately" is a perfect example of this. The proper method likely involves breaking the word up as follows: "un-fortun-ately." My personnel problem, and it is a personal problem, is I don’t even know how to spell fortune (two syllable, seven letters)/. And the idea that I should drop the "e" and replace it with "ately" drive me stupid.
So here is my retarded method in action: "un-for-tuna-tely." If you read it out load it sounds something like, "one for tuna telly" which sounds like some kind of British or Irish old saying.
"know, what I mean mate? All for one and one for the tuna telly, heh?"
Friday, April 16, 2010
Army photographers
The following message is being shared on behalf of MSG Sparks….
My fellow Senior PA NCOs,
I'd like to share my individual opinion regarding the AAR comments, particularly, "Technically, a number of photos had either soft focus or were completely out of focus, and color levels were not adjusted. Finally, many photos failed to truly tell the story, either lacking a clear subject or having no subject at all."
For quite some time the quality of photographs taken by Army photographers (I don't include the 25V) have been on the decline from a technical standpoint. As we know the overall emphasis of photography taught at DINFOS during the Basic Journalist Course is not enough. Currently, students spend a total of 88 hours broken into 17.5 Lecture, 21 Performance Exercise, 5 Written Examination, and 44.5 Performance Examination on learning photojournalism. From my conclusion, most of what these new photographers understand is turn the camera on and shoot using autofocus. This is their mentality and if they're lucky to get a good shot, then so be it.
Trust me, I understand that DINFOS is nothing more than the institutional foundation to teach the basics of photography, and the rest is up to us - the Senior PA NCO whether at Division or higher. Herein lies the problem. I'm not sure how many of our Senior PA NCOs take the time out teach this very important craft. Also, we have a high number of NCOs who have reclassed into the field and outside of the BJC course, I'm not exactly sure how many have acquired additional photography training, so who is supposed to teach our new troops this craft? For example, I had a brand new troop arrive to Korea straight out of DINFOS and he was promoted to SSG the day he graduated. When that troop shows up for an assignment, no one knows he's a brand new SSG right out of school, they see the rank and have a level of expectation when it comes to the final product. We, Senior PA NCOs, have to rapidly hone the skills of these young sergeants because in a short matter of time, they'll be the Senior PA NCO with very little expertise in their craft.
We have to look at other ways and methods to get our Soldiers trained, whether it's getting funds to send a troop to a week-long photography workshop or we become better as the SME to teach. For example, I ensured during our mandatory Sergeants Time Training while assigned to 2nd Infantry Division at Korea that one Thursday was dedicated to MOS specific and we had an entire day of photography training. Most importantly over the years, I had my Soldiers enroll in a photography class if the local university offered the course so they can get "hands on" training twice a week from a professor which enhanced their technical knowledge of photo composition.
Also the high frequency of deployments is not allowing so many of our Soldiers attend the Intermediate Photojournalism Course. When many of our Soldiers return, how do we tell them to go away for an additional 10 weeks to Fort Meade when they've already been away from family for a year. Add on the time to reset and prepare for redeployment which is supposed to be their dwell time and now you have a disgruntled Soldier and family members.
I've ranted enough, but this problem of photography has become rampant throughout the CMF. We have to find ways to get these sergeants trained either at IPC or Syracuse, because this very critical craft is a key enabler for us to communicate our (Army) messages to our key audiences.
MSG Donald Sparks
Public Affairs Chief
U.S. Special Operations Command - Europe
My fellow Senior PA NCOs,
I'd like to share my individual opinion regarding the AAR comments, particularly, "Technically, a number of photos had either soft focus or were completely out of focus, and color levels were not adjusted. Finally, many photos failed to truly tell the story, either lacking a clear subject or having no subject at all."
For quite some time the quality of photographs taken by Army photographers (I don't include the 25V) have been on the decline from a technical standpoint. As we know the overall emphasis of photography taught at DINFOS during the Basic Journalist Course is not enough. Currently, students spend a total of 88 hours broken into 17.5 Lecture, 21 Performance Exercise, 5 Written Examination, and 44.5 Performance Examination on learning photojournalism. From my conclusion, most of what these new photographers understand is turn the camera on and shoot using autofocus. This is their mentality and if they're lucky to get a good shot, then so be it.
Trust me, I understand that DINFOS is nothing more than the institutional foundation to teach the basics of photography, and the rest is up to us - the Senior PA NCO whether at Division or higher. Herein lies the problem. I'm not sure how many of our Senior PA NCOs take the time out teach this very important craft. Also, we have a high number of NCOs who have reclassed into the field and outside of the BJC course, I'm not exactly sure how many have acquired additional photography training, so who is supposed to teach our new troops this craft? For example, I had a brand new troop arrive to Korea straight out of DINFOS and he was promoted to SSG the day he graduated. When that troop shows up for an assignment, no one knows he's a brand new SSG right out of school, they see the rank and have a level of expectation when it comes to the final product. We, Senior PA NCOs, have to rapidly hone the skills of these young sergeants because in a short matter of time, they'll be the Senior PA NCO with very little expertise in their craft.
We have to look at other ways and methods to get our Soldiers trained, whether it's getting funds to send a troop to a week-long photography workshop or we become better as the SME to teach. For example, I ensured during our mandatory Sergeants Time Training while assigned to 2nd Infantry Division at Korea that one Thursday was dedicated to MOS specific and we had an entire day of photography training. Most importantly over the years, I had my Soldiers enroll in a photography class if the local university offered the course so they can get "hands on" training twice a week from a professor which enhanced their technical knowledge of photo composition.
Also the high frequency of deployments is not allowing so many of our Soldiers attend the Intermediate Photojournalism Course. When many of our Soldiers return, how do we tell them to go away for an additional 10 weeks to Fort Meade when they've already been away from family for a year. Add on the time to reset and prepare for redeployment which is supposed to be their dwell time and now you have a disgruntled Soldier and family members.
I've ranted enough, but this problem of photography has become rampant throughout the CMF. We have to find ways to get these sergeants trained either at IPC or Syracuse, because this very critical craft is a key enabler for us to communicate our (Army) messages to our key audiences.
MSG Donald Sparks
Public Affairs Chief
U.S. Special Operations Command - Europe
Thursday, April 15, 2010
In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication
from:
PARAMETERS
US Army War College Quarterly
Winter 2009-10, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4
by DENNIS M. MURPHY
Strategic communication in the Department of Defense clearly has moved forward under the tutelage of Secretary Robert Gates. In a far-ranging speech at the University of Kansas in November 2007, Dr. Gates bemoaned the inability of the United States to communicate to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture.”
Had the discussion ended there, a legitimate impression may have been conveyed that senior officials in the national security and foreign affairs sectors of the US government still were sorting out how to apply the principles of strategic communication.
But on 17 September 2008, Dr. Gates announced a new policy of apologizing for Afghan civilian casualties and offering compensation to survivors even before all the facts were known. There were obvious downfalls to this decision, not the least of which is that the wrong people might be compensated. But perhaps Dr. Gates is demonstrating that he understands the value of a rapid, compassionate response. The policy aim had much less to do with compensation and everything to do with sending a message that the United States cares about the Afghan people.2 So the Secretary’s action closed a proverbial “say do” gap and made inroads in the elusive battle of ideas. It was a first but important step in this ongoing and generational ideological struggle. Secretary Gates then changed commanders and strategy in Afghanistan, recognizing the importance, in large part, of the perceptions of the Afghan people regarding American military actions and presence.
Strategic communication is, at its essence, the orchestration of actions, words, and images to create cognitive information effects.3 In the arena of the warfighter, these effects inherently support the achievement of military objectives. It is safe to say that the explosion of information technology and ready availability of communication methods will mean all military operations, across the spectrum of conflict, will depend heavily on the proper distribution of information to support mission success. Consequently, an understanding of how to incorporate strategic communication into warfighting paradigms to enhance effectiveness is imperative. Secretary Gates’s aforementioned policy decisions emphasize this fact by providing an example of the increasing merger of the tactical (collateral civilian casualties) with the strategic in a near-transparent information environment.
The nature of warfare and military decision-making is understood to be both art and science, the combination of which varies according to situational and functional circumstances.4 Given the importance of strategic communication to current and future warfare, it is essential to consider its application from both perspectives. Such a review will find that US warfighting commanders have the skills honed in current military education and training to employ the “art” of strategic communication, but require a shift in organizational culture to maximize application of that art. On the other hand, they risk failure without expert help when considering the “science” of strategic communication.
The Art of Strategic Communication
The US military’s capstone manual, Joint Publication 1, states that: War is a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules . . . . [There is] a burden on the commander to remain responsive, versatile, and adaptive in real time to seize opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities. This is the art of war.
Warfighting commanders practice this art of war, not in haphazard fashion, but by applying their experience to time-honored processes in the planning and execution of military battles and campaigns. The military decisionmaking process (campaign planning process at higher levels) is taught to and applied by leaders through all levels of their careers. The planning process is driven, first and foremost, by the commander’s intent. Adaptation in the execution of military missions then occurs within an iterative “decide,
detect, deliver, and assess” loop paradigm. While all phases of this loop are important, the assessment phase allows the commander to gauge the success of battles and campaigns and determine future actions in light of results. The commander’s intent and the assessment phase of execution provide both opportunities and challenges to strategic communication’s ability to enable mission success.
Dennis M. Murphy is Director of the Information in Warfare Group at the Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College where he teaches information operations and strategic communication elective courses and conducts workshops focused on the information element of power.
Commander’s Intent
The commander’s intent “articulate(s) the purpose of the campaign being conducted and the . . . commander’s vision of the military end-state when military operations are concluded.”
It serves as the impetus for operational planning. Senior and mid-level military leaders have evolved in a culture that emphasizes kinetic warfighting skills, both in planning and execution. Anecdotal evidence indicates this background may be influential during the initial months of tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq, resulting in slow adaptation to the requirements for the incorporation of the information effects of strategic communication on operations.8 This cultural propensity toward kinetic action will remain intact without a significant “forcing function” to refocus commanders, staffs, and subordinate units toward an emphasis on information effects. Christine MacNulty, in her monograph Transformation from the Outside in or Inside out?, notes that organizational culture change occurs slowly over time: “People do change their mindsets . . . but it usually happens in a fairly slow, evolutionary fashion.”9 Unfortunately, in time of war, slow, evolutionary change is paid for in blood, and so the time gap has to be eliminated.
To be sure, the military has recognized the importance of information (and other nonlethal) effects as illuminated in the Army and Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency operations.10 While progress has been made in that regard, it is interesting to note that Secretary Gates’s policy decision regarding compensation for civilian casualties occurred nearly two years after the manual was published, thus reinforcing the pattern of slow, evolutionary change. Add to this challenge the fact that strategic communication is often a misunderstood concept when doctrinal underpinnings are absent, along with the previously mentioned cultural bias toward the kinetic, and it becomes easier to realize why the opportunities to exploit success in the information environment are not yet prevalent.
The path to addressing these problems, if we are to realize the full benefit of strategic communication, lies in having a clearly stated information, end-state to accompany the traditional military end-state. The information endstate is a description of what the information environment will look like at the conclusion of military operations. It should consider the cognitive dimension of the information environment. This cognitive description includes the desired perceptions and attitudes of the intended audience (e.g., the indigenous population or international community).
A properly articulated information end-state will drive the planning and execution of the military operation. Military courses of action will be analyzed against this vision, and subordinate military units will carry out the operation in an effort to achieve the described end-state in the commander’s intent. Sensitized to this intent, planners “wargame” the courses of action with that end-state in mind. Consequently, planners will consider an enemy’s expected reaction to any friendly forces’ actions in terms of the required information end-state. This assessment will include recognition that friendly kinetic action may result in an enemy asymmetric information reaction. Planners can then prepare counteractions to blunt the enemy information attack or elect to choose an alternate course of action. Additionally, the information end-state will determine how subordinate units execute their mission. Actions send loud and clear messages to the target audience.
Where previously a kinetic solution may have been the preferred choice (driven by inherent organizational culture), the information end-state may dictate a different approach, achieving the stated cognitive effect related to perceptions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior in support of achieving the commander’s overarching objectives.
The commander’s intent when amplified by the simple inclusion of an information end-state supports the application of the art of war in strategic communication from the outset of planning and execution. It permits that art to mature within the current planning processes and paradigms and, perhaps most importantly, ensures the commander owns this critical enabler.
The inclusion of an information end-state is an important step in proactively managing the information environment in support of military objectives. That same environment, however, guarantees that “wildcards” may occur as unpredictable, disruptive forces, even when an information end-state is available to sensitize the warfighter to cognitive effects. These incidents will significantly impact a military operation, whether the wildcard is the release of a gruesome civilian terrorist video on the Internet, false rumors of collateral damage involving civilians, or stories of friendly forces using a holy book for target practice. While the military response to such events seems necessarily reactive in nature, current planning processes facilitate proactive consideration of such events. In military planning a “branch” is “a contingency option built into the basic plan . . . . It is used to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. It answers the question ‘what if?’”
As with the commander’s intent, however, an organizational culture shift is required, if we are to successfully apply the existing process to the expected information environment; but the branch process does currently exist and is widely understood. While branch planning cannot account for every possible wildcard, it can anticipate that wildcards will occur and, at a minimum, establish procedures to deal with them.
Assessment: Measures of Effectiveness
The same organizational culture that skews actions toward the kinetic also impacts the assessment of information effects defined by the end-state. Kinetic action, by its nature, provides the instant gratification of measuring effectiveness by physical forensic evidence: a bomb is dropped, a building is destroyed. But, given the unique nature of the human behavior model, measuring the effectiveness of strategic communication efforts on perceptions and attitudes is much more problematic and typically occurs over time.
Complicating matters is Dr. Steve Corman’s application of the pragmatic complexity theory to strategic communication. Corman implies that a feedback loop is necessary in the application of strategic communication (an accepted part of the military process) but offers that the number of variables portends initial failure of communication efforts. Strategic communication then becomes a series of variations of messages (through actions, images, and words), and selecting and retaining those that work best.13 This means the “decide, detect, deliver, assess” model is still relevant, but the assessment of results occurs more slowly over time and is more complicated than when the process is applied to kinetic actions.
It is not hard to understand why the military commander, expecting the immediate results that his kinetic experience provides, and ingrained to focus on rapid success, may question the value of strategic communication to mission accomplishment. This is especially true when valuable resources are applied against the effort. (Do you put a combat cameraman or a machine gunner on a helicopter flying into the battle zone?)14 In much the same manner as an information end-state offers an opportunity to overcome cultural reticence, informational measures of effectiveness need to be developed with organizational culture in mind. Typical measurements for strategic communication are costly in terms of time, money, and manpower and usually require a special expertise. These measurements can include polling, focus groups, and media analysis. To reduce the associated expense, the military would be well-served to develop “field expedient” measures of effectiveness. Colonel Ralph Baker described his experience using such methods as a brigade combat team commander in Iraq. The number and categories of people waving as a patrol moved through a village and the amount, type, or lack of graffiti on village walls acted as metrics to determine attitudes and perceptions reflective of changes in behavior. Soldiers within the brigade became some of the primary sources of information, and Baker evaluated their collection efforts in terms of the doctrinally accepted commander’s critical information requirements. Before dismissing this example as only applicable to tactical situations, it is well to remember that tactical action in the information realm has long- and short-term operational and strategic implications. While Baker’s use of these measures was necessarily a commonsense approach in a combat zone, social scientists may just as readily codify a list of measures that are easily and efficiently available to field commanders.
The commander also needs to overcome the false need for instant gratification that is the expected norm for kinetic measures of effectiveness. Consequently, identification and formulation of intermediate information effects reflecting progress toward achieving the ultimate information end-state can be of equal or greater value. Evidence of the impact of strategic communication efforts is a more near-term reality, and commanders will gain confidence over time that the cost of the effort is providing benefits in support of mission accomplishment.
The art of strategic communication, with appropriate changes to accommodate the inherent military culture, is fully achievable within the current military processes described in this article. But even this discussion has hinted at the complexity of the human behavior model and the requirement that science be stringently applied to the model to ensure expected results.
The Science of Strategic Communication
While the art of war is, by its nature, a function of experience applied within codified processes, the science of war takes that experience and provides rigor to the analysis driven by those processes. As such, science verifies or questions art. In this manner science often ensures that specific actions taken to execute the military plan produce the anticipated results.
(The science of ballistics and Newtonian physics come to mind in the kinetic warfight.) As previously noted, the US military’s joint doctrine related to operations fully embraces this concept when it notes that “decision-making is both art and science.”
Science is particularly important in the conduct of strategic communication as a means of producing the intended information effects. Consider an information end-state that requires the population of a village to remain neutral in their attitude toward a US military presence at the conclusion of an operation. What are the actions, images, and words that ensure the appropriate effect? The answer is, “it depends.” What it depends upon is how those actions, images, and words are perceived by the local inhabitants. A deep understanding of the human behavior model, specifically culture and how it informs emotion, is critical to obtaining behavior change that is driven by perception and attitude, thus ensuring the desired information end-state.
The difficulty with cultural understanding is that culture is, by its very nature, a local phenomenon. As MacNulty notes: The society in which we live—in this context not the national culture . . .
but the fairly small area in which we grow up . . . results in different culture, values, beliefs, religion, and views about money, work, marriage, gender roles, and so on.
Neighborhoods take on their own personalities, driven by such considerations as socio-economic factors and ethnic and racial identity. Value sets are different among communities that form the integrated society of a large US city. Transfer this reality to a foreign country where the US military is conducting operations. It should not be difficult to understand how challenging it is to influence perceptions among audiences with a “one-size-fits all” set of actions and messages.
Military leaders, typically having served several tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, find themselves in different positions in terms of leadership and geographic locations than on previous tours. Because culture is a localized phenomenon, the culture that these leaders are expected to understand in the new environment may have dramatically changed. Commanders have become more adept over time in recognizing the importance of cultural differences and sensitivities impacting mission success. But the truth of the matter is little changed; cultural understanding of local audiences remains a major challenge for most military leaders. The fact remains that an intuitive understanding of or an advanced education in psychology, sociology, or cultural anthropology will not broadly occur among America’s warfighting commanders. In fact, exposure to these concepts leaves most military commanders with two overarching reactions: Cultural understanding is important, and cultural understanding is difficult. Instead, the military should attempt to increase the general knowledge of its leaders and enlist external sources to provide specifics on the inward or hidden nature of cultural expertise.
Language Education and Staff Expertise
Studying a language by its very nature exposes the student to a greater understanding of regional culture. In recognition of the critical role that language skills play in cultural understanding and sensitivity, the Department of Defense published a “Defense Language Transformation Roadmap” in early 2005. The goals of the roadmap are admirable, but the proposals outlined have met with mixed results.20 A critical omission in the roadmap is that it lacks a requirement linking language proficiency with accession of military leaders. Prescribed military operational and educational requirements fully describe an individual’s progression during his or her military career. Adding a language requirement for military officers will succeed for specific specialties where that type of education is important to their military job performance (e.g., foreign area officers). But such a program will only touch a small percentage of officers. Instead, language requirements need to be included in Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarships and reemphasized at the military academies. The language to be studied need not be specified in this pre-accession stage. The key is to gain a general understanding of cultural differences achieved through language education for the maximum number of future leaders. The United States, as a global military power, finds itself involved in operations across the spectrum of conflict. This circumstance will continue into the future. Is Urdu the language du jour? Farsi? Mandarin? Without question, there will be a need for a language “surge” capability designed for specific conflicts. Such requirements can be addressed through incentives for pre-accessions and codified to draw support from the general population. The broad requirement of language skills tied to accession, however, will ensure that future military commanders are exposed to the importance culture portends for warfighting.
Beyond the general cultural sensitivity language education provides, inherent military staff expertise in social sciences such as cultural anthropology is critical to identifying local cues to issues that enhance warfighting success. Once again, the military has recognized this fact and deployed “human terrain teams” (HTT) to work on brigade-level staffs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s Combined Arms Center published a handbook in 2008 on the functions of these teams that begins with insight by then-Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli:
“Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the local culture and psyche is the foremost planning consideration for every operation.”
Despite accolades provided by commanders regarding the value of these teams, the number of HTTs is limited, and a great deal of their expertise is in fact provided bynonuniformed team members. These civilian experts typically have advanced degrees in the social sciences. But the limited number of teams, coupled with their acknowledged success, demonstrates a need for military staffs to have similar expertise. Not every staff can have an HTT; not every situation is prioritized for HTT deployment. (Consider US combatant command theater engagement activities in the shaping or deterrent phases of military operations.)
The military would do well to develop and assign a cultural skill set to existing uniformed staff sections.24 Greater educational opportunities in the appropriate social sciences would support such a decision (both in advanced civilian and professional military education). Psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs specialists seem best suited to assume these roles and functions. PSYOP professionals tend to be more adept at understanding the nuances of segmented audience research and analysis. But even they would need additional education in anthropological cues that ensure appropriate information effects are achieved. Civil affairs practitioners work on a variety of civic projects, interacting with leaders and the general population of a village or region. Given that interaction, they are perhaps the appropriate staff members to evaluate and determine the cultural nuances of the local population. Again, a more in-depth education related to the general nature of these signals is required.
The value of this approach goes beyond simply manning each staff with cultural experts, although accomplishing such steps is critically important. It is the military member who shares the organizational culture of his command. He understands the commander’s intent, along with its stated information end-state, and how it is designed to support the accomplishment of the military objective. He is the individual who can look for those cultural cues impacting military success and then appropriately translate them to other staff members and the commander. The relationship of the information end-state and cultural understanding now has the potential of becoming synergistic. The commander specifies the behavior change that is intended through actions, images, and words (the art). The cultural expert on the staff applies the human behavior model (the science) against the intended audience to ensure these actions, images, and words result in success. The cultural expert then continues his observations within the community to determine the effectiveness of the information effort, providing feedback that can be used to modify future strategic communication efforts.
There is another advantage to having a single uniformed staff function focused on local cultural understanding. Currently, units rotate into combat areas for a period of 12 months. During the initial deployment phase Science is particularly important in the conduct of strategic communication as a means of producing the intended information effects.
The PSYOP or civil affairs officer assigned to cultural duties may possess a general understanding of various social science principles but not the specific details associated with the local area of operation. Over time, however, that type of data will be developed into a general framework of information and knowledge. Critical factors such as key influencers, demographics, employment, and history, among others, will allow for a broader understanding.
Such factors can be captured in a transferable database for any replacement units or new staff officers. In this manner a general expertise of the various social sciences can be translated over time and unit rotations into a detailed, long-term understanding of local culture in support of strategic communication efforts. Consequently, when the next unit arrives, there will be significantly less time spent in determining the local cultural mosaic.
External Cultural Expertise
It is safe to say that the US military cannot accurately determine where the next crisis may occur. Predicting the next conflict (or disaster requiring humanitarian support) is an educated guess at best. How then can the military proactively adopt the science of strategic communication without being entirely reactive?25 The answer lies in the development of a prioritized database containing cultural experts and key cultural factors, capable of supporting the requirements of geographic combatant commands. Is Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, a potential location of future US military engagement? If so, the US European Command should cultivate and enlist experts who possess a deep understanding of that regional culture and local nuances. Those experts may already exist within the intelligence community and diplomatic corps. Allies and friendly nations, nongovernmental organizations, and academia are also potential sources. Where possible the geographic combatant command should define the output parameters of any desired database, ensuring that it encompasses cultural makeup. These output parameters and requirements need to be linked to potential or current (in the case of theater security plans) military objectives. Key influencers, the people within a culture most likely to be credible and trusted messengers, would be an essential part of any database. Proactive development of prioritized cultural databases provides a good start for any military operation where information effects are certain to impact success.
Conclusion
The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz noted that “the first, the supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking.” It is safe to say that, given the recent increases in access to information, information effects driven by strategic communication processes will remain key to military success.28 With that in mind, it is critical that the military understand how to plan and execute strategic communication in their effort to effectively and efficiently support desired outcomes.
This approach requires a greater understanding of both the art and science in the application of strategic communication. Instituting an explicit change to military doctrine in the form of an information end-state contained within the commander’s intent will place information as a warfighting function on the same level as maneuver, enhancing the art of command. Streamlining measures of effectiveness to ensure a more rapid feedback mechanism is essential. Emphasis on foreign language skills as part of accession requirements for military leaders; developing and resourcing specific branches or specialties with a deeper understanding of cultural anthropology; and creating databases of cultural experts prioritized to meet the needs of combatant commands will provide immeasurable advantages in tomorrow’s uncertain geostrategic environment. Taking these steps now will ensure that, in the end, strategic communication will be an inherent and critical part of any military operation, supported by the necessary expertise required to be effective in achieving military objectives.
(see original text for works cited)
PARAMETERS
US Army War College Quarterly
Winter 2009-10, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4
by DENNIS M. MURPHY
Strategic communication in the Department of Defense clearly has moved forward under the tutelage of Secretary Robert Gates. In a far-ranging speech at the University of Kansas in November 2007, Dr. Gates bemoaned the inability of the United States to communicate to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture.”
Had the discussion ended there, a legitimate impression may have been conveyed that senior officials in the national security and foreign affairs sectors of the US government still were sorting out how to apply the principles of strategic communication.
But on 17 September 2008, Dr. Gates announced a new policy of apologizing for Afghan civilian casualties and offering compensation to survivors even before all the facts were known. There were obvious downfalls to this decision, not the least of which is that the wrong people might be compensated. But perhaps Dr. Gates is demonstrating that he understands the value of a rapid, compassionate response. The policy aim had much less to do with compensation and everything to do with sending a message that the United States cares about the Afghan people.2 So the Secretary’s action closed a proverbial “say do” gap and made inroads in the elusive battle of ideas. It was a first but important step in this ongoing and generational ideological struggle. Secretary Gates then changed commanders and strategy in Afghanistan, recognizing the importance, in large part, of the perceptions of the Afghan people regarding American military actions and presence.
Strategic communication is, at its essence, the orchestration of actions, words, and images to create cognitive information effects.3 In the arena of the warfighter, these effects inherently support the achievement of military objectives. It is safe to say that the explosion of information technology and ready availability of communication methods will mean all military operations, across the spectrum of conflict, will depend heavily on the proper distribution of information to support mission success. Consequently, an understanding of how to incorporate strategic communication into warfighting paradigms to enhance effectiveness is imperative. Secretary Gates’s aforementioned policy decisions emphasize this fact by providing an example of the increasing merger of the tactical (collateral civilian casualties) with the strategic in a near-transparent information environment.
The nature of warfare and military decision-making is understood to be both art and science, the combination of which varies according to situational and functional circumstances.4 Given the importance of strategic communication to current and future warfare, it is essential to consider its application from both perspectives. Such a review will find that US warfighting commanders have the skills honed in current military education and training to employ the “art” of strategic communication, but require a shift in organizational culture to maximize application of that art. On the other hand, they risk failure without expert help when considering the “science” of strategic communication.
The Art of Strategic Communication
The US military’s capstone manual, Joint Publication 1, states that: War is a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules . . . . [There is] a burden on the commander to remain responsive, versatile, and adaptive in real time to seize opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities. This is the art of war.
Warfighting commanders practice this art of war, not in haphazard fashion, but by applying their experience to time-honored processes in the planning and execution of military battles and campaigns. The military decisionmaking process (campaign planning process at higher levels) is taught to and applied by leaders through all levels of their careers. The planning process is driven, first and foremost, by the commander’s intent. Adaptation in the execution of military missions then occurs within an iterative “decide,
detect, deliver, and assess” loop paradigm. While all phases of this loop are important, the assessment phase allows the commander to gauge the success of battles and campaigns and determine future actions in light of results. The commander’s intent and the assessment phase of execution provide both opportunities and challenges to strategic communication’s ability to enable mission success.
Dennis M. Murphy is Director of the Information in Warfare Group at the Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College where he teaches information operations and strategic communication elective courses and conducts workshops focused on the information element of power.
Commander’s Intent
The commander’s intent “articulate(s) the purpose of the campaign being conducted and the . . . commander’s vision of the military end-state when military operations are concluded.”
It serves as the impetus for operational planning. Senior and mid-level military leaders have evolved in a culture that emphasizes kinetic warfighting skills, both in planning and execution. Anecdotal evidence indicates this background may be influential during the initial months of tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq, resulting in slow adaptation to the requirements for the incorporation of the information effects of strategic communication on operations.8 This cultural propensity toward kinetic action will remain intact without a significant “forcing function” to refocus commanders, staffs, and subordinate units toward an emphasis on information effects. Christine MacNulty, in her monograph Transformation from the Outside in or Inside out?, notes that organizational culture change occurs slowly over time: “People do change their mindsets . . . but it usually happens in a fairly slow, evolutionary fashion.”9 Unfortunately, in time of war, slow, evolutionary change is paid for in blood, and so the time gap has to be eliminated.
To be sure, the military has recognized the importance of information (and other nonlethal) effects as illuminated in the Army and Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency operations.10 While progress has been made in that regard, it is interesting to note that Secretary Gates’s policy decision regarding compensation for civilian casualties occurred nearly two years after the manual was published, thus reinforcing the pattern of slow, evolutionary change. Add to this challenge the fact that strategic communication is often a misunderstood concept when doctrinal underpinnings are absent, along with the previously mentioned cultural bias toward the kinetic, and it becomes easier to realize why the opportunities to exploit success in the information environment are not yet prevalent.
The path to addressing these problems, if we are to realize the full benefit of strategic communication, lies in having a clearly stated information, end-state to accompany the traditional military end-state. The information endstate is a description of what the information environment will look like at the conclusion of military operations. It should consider the cognitive dimension of the information environment. This cognitive description includes the desired perceptions and attitudes of the intended audience (e.g., the indigenous population or international community).
A properly articulated information end-state will drive the planning and execution of the military operation. Military courses of action will be analyzed against this vision, and subordinate military units will carry out the operation in an effort to achieve the described end-state in the commander’s intent. Sensitized to this intent, planners “wargame” the courses of action with that end-state in mind. Consequently, planners will consider an enemy’s expected reaction to any friendly forces’ actions in terms of the required information end-state. This assessment will include recognition that friendly kinetic action may result in an enemy asymmetric information reaction. Planners can then prepare counteractions to blunt the enemy information attack or elect to choose an alternate course of action. Additionally, the information end-state will determine how subordinate units execute their mission. Actions send loud and clear messages to the target audience.
Where previously a kinetic solution may have been the preferred choice (driven by inherent organizational culture), the information end-state may dictate a different approach, achieving the stated cognitive effect related to perceptions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior in support of achieving the commander’s overarching objectives.
The commander’s intent when amplified by the simple inclusion of an information end-state supports the application of the art of war in strategic communication from the outset of planning and execution. It permits that art to mature within the current planning processes and paradigms and, perhaps most importantly, ensures the commander owns this critical enabler.
The inclusion of an information end-state is an important step in proactively managing the information environment in support of military objectives. That same environment, however, guarantees that “wildcards” may occur as unpredictable, disruptive forces, even when an information end-state is available to sensitize the warfighter to cognitive effects. These incidents will significantly impact a military operation, whether the wildcard is the release of a gruesome civilian terrorist video on the Internet, false rumors of collateral damage involving civilians, or stories of friendly forces using a holy book for target practice. While the military response to such events seems necessarily reactive in nature, current planning processes facilitate proactive consideration of such events. In military planning a “branch” is “a contingency option built into the basic plan . . . . It is used to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. It answers the question ‘what if?’”
As with the commander’s intent, however, an organizational culture shift is required, if we are to successfully apply the existing process to the expected information environment; but the branch process does currently exist and is widely understood. While branch planning cannot account for every possible wildcard, it can anticipate that wildcards will occur and, at a minimum, establish procedures to deal with them.
Assessment: Measures of Effectiveness
The same organizational culture that skews actions toward the kinetic also impacts the assessment of information effects defined by the end-state. Kinetic action, by its nature, provides the instant gratification of measuring effectiveness by physical forensic evidence: a bomb is dropped, a building is destroyed. But, given the unique nature of the human behavior model, measuring the effectiveness of strategic communication efforts on perceptions and attitudes is much more problematic and typically occurs over time.
Complicating matters is Dr. Steve Corman’s application of the pragmatic complexity theory to strategic communication. Corman implies that a feedback loop is necessary in the application of strategic communication (an accepted part of the military process) but offers that the number of variables portends initial failure of communication efforts. Strategic communication then becomes a series of variations of messages (through actions, images, and words), and selecting and retaining those that work best.13 This means the “decide, detect, deliver, assess” model is still relevant, but the assessment of results occurs more slowly over time and is more complicated than when the process is applied to kinetic actions.
It is not hard to understand why the military commander, expecting the immediate results that his kinetic experience provides, and ingrained to focus on rapid success, may question the value of strategic communication to mission accomplishment. This is especially true when valuable resources are applied against the effort. (Do you put a combat cameraman or a machine gunner on a helicopter flying into the battle zone?)14 In much the same manner as an information end-state offers an opportunity to overcome cultural reticence, informational measures of effectiveness need to be developed with organizational culture in mind. Typical measurements for strategic communication are costly in terms of time, money, and manpower and usually require a special expertise. These measurements can include polling, focus groups, and media analysis. To reduce the associated expense, the military would be well-served to develop “field expedient” measures of effectiveness. Colonel Ralph Baker described his experience using such methods as a brigade combat team commander in Iraq. The number and categories of people waving as a patrol moved through a village and the amount, type, or lack of graffiti on village walls acted as metrics to determine attitudes and perceptions reflective of changes in behavior. Soldiers within the brigade became some of the primary sources of information, and Baker evaluated their collection efforts in terms of the doctrinally accepted commander’s critical information requirements. Before dismissing this example as only applicable to tactical situations, it is well to remember that tactical action in the information realm has long- and short-term operational and strategic implications. While Baker’s use of these measures was necessarily a commonsense approach in a combat zone, social scientists may just as readily codify a list of measures that are easily and efficiently available to field commanders.
The commander also needs to overcome the false need for instant gratification that is the expected norm for kinetic measures of effectiveness. Consequently, identification and formulation of intermediate information effects reflecting progress toward achieving the ultimate information end-state can be of equal or greater value. Evidence of the impact of strategic communication efforts is a more near-term reality, and commanders will gain confidence over time that the cost of the effort is providing benefits in support of mission accomplishment.
The art of strategic communication, with appropriate changes to accommodate the inherent military culture, is fully achievable within the current military processes described in this article. But even this discussion has hinted at the complexity of the human behavior model and the requirement that science be stringently applied to the model to ensure expected results.
The Science of Strategic Communication
While the art of war is, by its nature, a function of experience applied within codified processes, the science of war takes that experience and provides rigor to the analysis driven by those processes. As such, science verifies or questions art. In this manner science often ensures that specific actions taken to execute the military plan produce the anticipated results.
(The science of ballistics and Newtonian physics come to mind in the kinetic warfight.) As previously noted, the US military’s joint doctrine related to operations fully embraces this concept when it notes that “decision-making is both art and science.”
Science is particularly important in the conduct of strategic communication as a means of producing the intended information effects. Consider an information end-state that requires the population of a village to remain neutral in their attitude toward a US military presence at the conclusion of an operation. What are the actions, images, and words that ensure the appropriate effect? The answer is, “it depends.” What it depends upon is how those actions, images, and words are perceived by the local inhabitants. A deep understanding of the human behavior model, specifically culture and how it informs emotion, is critical to obtaining behavior change that is driven by perception and attitude, thus ensuring the desired information end-state.
The difficulty with cultural understanding is that culture is, by its very nature, a local phenomenon. As MacNulty notes: The society in which we live—in this context not the national culture . . .
but the fairly small area in which we grow up . . . results in different culture, values, beliefs, religion, and views about money, work, marriage, gender roles, and so on.
Neighborhoods take on their own personalities, driven by such considerations as socio-economic factors and ethnic and racial identity. Value sets are different among communities that form the integrated society of a large US city. Transfer this reality to a foreign country where the US military is conducting operations. It should not be difficult to understand how challenging it is to influence perceptions among audiences with a “one-size-fits all” set of actions and messages.
Military leaders, typically having served several tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, find themselves in different positions in terms of leadership and geographic locations than on previous tours. Because culture is a localized phenomenon, the culture that these leaders are expected to understand in the new environment may have dramatically changed. Commanders have become more adept over time in recognizing the importance of cultural differences and sensitivities impacting mission success. But the truth of the matter is little changed; cultural understanding of local audiences remains a major challenge for most military leaders. The fact remains that an intuitive understanding of or an advanced education in psychology, sociology, or cultural anthropology will not broadly occur among America’s warfighting commanders. In fact, exposure to these concepts leaves most military commanders with two overarching reactions: Cultural understanding is important, and cultural understanding is difficult. Instead, the military should attempt to increase the general knowledge of its leaders and enlist external sources to provide specifics on the inward or hidden nature of cultural expertise.
Language Education and Staff Expertise
Studying a language by its very nature exposes the student to a greater understanding of regional culture. In recognition of the critical role that language skills play in cultural understanding and sensitivity, the Department of Defense published a “Defense Language Transformation Roadmap” in early 2005. The goals of the roadmap are admirable, but the proposals outlined have met with mixed results.20 A critical omission in the roadmap is that it lacks a requirement linking language proficiency with accession of military leaders. Prescribed military operational and educational requirements fully describe an individual’s progression during his or her military career. Adding a language requirement for military officers will succeed for specific specialties where that type of education is important to their military job performance (e.g., foreign area officers). But such a program will only touch a small percentage of officers. Instead, language requirements need to be included in Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarships and reemphasized at the military academies. The language to be studied need not be specified in this pre-accession stage. The key is to gain a general understanding of cultural differences achieved through language education for the maximum number of future leaders. The United States, as a global military power, finds itself involved in operations across the spectrum of conflict. This circumstance will continue into the future. Is Urdu the language du jour? Farsi? Mandarin? Without question, there will be a need for a language “surge” capability designed for specific conflicts. Such requirements can be addressed through incentives for pre-accessions and codified to draw support from the general population. The broad requirement of language skills tied to accession, however, will ensure that future military commanders are exposed to the importance culture portends for warfighting.
Beyond the general cultural sensitivity language education provides, inherent military staff expertise in social sciences such as cultural anthropology is critical to identifying local cues to issues that enhance warfighting success. Once again, the military has recognized this fact and deployed “human terrain teams” (HTT) to work on brigade-level staffs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s Combined Arms Center published a handbook in 2008 on the functions of these teams that begins with insight by then-Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli:
“Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the local culture and psyche is the foremost planning consideration for every operation.”
Despite accolades provided by commanders regarding the value of these teams, the number of HTTs is limited, and a great deal of their expertise is in fact provided bynonuniformed team members. These civilian experts typically have advanced degrees in the social sciences. But the limited number of teams, coupled with their acknowledged success, demonstrates a need for military staffs to have similar expertise. Not every staff can have an HTT; not every situation is prioritized for HTT deployment. (Consider US combatant command theater engagement activities in the shaping or deterrent phases of military operations.)
The military would do well to develop and assign a cultural skill set to existing uniformed staff sections.24 Greater educational opportunities in the appropriate social sciences would support such a decision (both in advanced civilian and professional military education). Psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs specialists seem best suited to assume these roles and functions. PSYOP professionals tend to be more adept at understanding the nuances of segmented audience research and analysis. But even they would need additional education in anthropological cues that ensure appropriate information effects are achieved. Civil affairs practitioners work on a variety of civic projects, interacting with leaders and the general population of a village or region. Given that interaction, they are perhaps the appropriate staff members to evaluate and determine the cultural nuances of the local population. Again, a more in-depth education related to the general nature of these signals is required.
The value of this approach goes beyond simply manning each staff with cultural experts, although accomplishing such steps is critically important. It is the military member who shares the organizational culture of his command. He understands the commander’s intent, along with its stated information end-state, and how it is designed to support the accomplishment of the military objective. He is the individual who can look for those cultural cues impacting military success and then appropriately translate them to other staff members and the commander. The relationship of the information end-state and cultural understanding now has the potential of becoming synergistic. The commander specifies the behavior change that is intended through actions, images, and words (the art). The cultural expert on the staff applies the human behavior model (the science) against the intended audience to ensure these actions, images, and words result in success. The cultural expert then continues his observations within the community to determine the effectiveness of the information effort, providing feedback that can be used to modify future strategic communication efforts.
There is another advantage to having a single uniformed staff function focused on local cultural understanding. Currently, units rotate into combat areas for a period of 12 months. During the initial deployment phase Science is particularly important in the conduct of strategic communication as a means of producing the intended information effects.
The PSYOP or civil affairs officer assigned to cultural duties may possess a general understanding of various social science principles but not the specific details associated with the local area of operation. Over time, however, that type of data will be developed into a general framework of information and knowledge. Critical factors such as key influencers, demographics, employment, and history, among others, will allow for a broader understanding.
Such factors can be captured in a transferable database for any replacement units or new staff officers. In this manner a general expertise of the various social sciences can be translated over time and unit rotations into a detailed, long-term understanding of local culture in support of strategic communication efforts. Consequently, when the next unit arrives, there will be significantly less time spent in determining the local cultural mosaic.
External Cultural Expertise
It is safe to say that the US military cannot accurately determine where the next crisis may occur. Predicting the next conflict (or disaster requiring humanitarian support) is an educated guess at best. How then can the military proactively adopt the science of strategic communication without being entirely reactive?25 The answer lies in the development of a prioritized database containing cultural experts and key cultural factors, capable of supporting the requirements of geographic combatant commands. Is Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, a potential location of future US military engagement? If so, the US European Command should cultivate and enlist experts who possess a deep understanding of that regional culture and local nuances. Those experts may already exist within the intelligence community and diplomatic corps. Allies and friendly nations, nongovernmental organizations, and academia are also potential sources. Where possible the geographic combatant command should define the output parameters of any desired database, ensuring that it encompasses cultural makeup. These output parameters and requirements need to be linked to potential or current (in the case of theater security plans) military objectives. Key influencers, the people within a culture most likely to be credible and trusted messengers, would be an essential part of any database. Proactive development of prioritized cultural databases provides a good start for any military operation where information effects are certain to impact success.
Conclusion
The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz noted that “the first, the supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking.” It is safe to say that, given the recent increases in access to information, information effects driven by strategic communication processes will remain key to military success.28 With that in mind, it is critical that the military understand how to plan and execute strategic communication in their effort to effectively and efficiently support desired outcomes.
This approach requires a greater understanding of both the art and science in the application of strategic communication. Instituting an explicit change to military doctrine in the form of an information end-state contained within the commander’s intent will place information as a warfighting function on the same level as maneuver, enhancing the art of command. Streamlining measures of effectiveness to ensure a more rapid feedback mechanism is essential. Emphasis on foreign language skills as part of accession requirements for military leaders; developing and resourcing specific branches or specialties with a deeper understanding of cultural anthropology; and creating databases of cultural experts prioritized to meet the needs of combatant commands will provide immeasurable advantages in tomorrow’s uncertain geostrategic environment. Taking these steps now will ensure that, in the end, strategic communication will be an inherent and critical part of any military operation, supported by the necessary expertise required to be effective in achieving military objectives.
(see original text for works cited)
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Caution lights for the military's 'information war'
By David Ignatius
Wednesday, March 24, 2010; A17
It has become commonplace since Sept. 11, 2001, to speak of the "war of ideas" between Muslim extremists and the West. But there has been too little attention paid to the U.S. military's mobilization for this war, which is often described by the oxymoronic phrase "information operations."
To populate this information "battle space," the military has funded a range of contractors, specialists, training programs and initiatives -- targeted on the hot wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader zone of conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia. Gen. David Petraeus, the Centcom commander who oversees that region, has been one of the military's most vocal proponents of aggressive information operations.
The potential problems were highlighted on March 14, when the New York Times revealed that a Pentagon official from the "strategic communications" realm had funded contractors to gather intelligence in Afghanistan. Last week also brought a report by The Post's Ellen Nakashima that the military, in an offensive information operation, had shut down a jihadist Web site that the CIA had been monitoring for intelligence purposes. In both cases, it seemed the military was wandering into the covert-action arena traditionally reserved for the CIA.
This murky area should be marked with a flashing yellow warning light, meaning: "Slow down!" The United States should be careful about encouraging, in effect, the militarization of information -- and it should be especially cautious when these efforts bleed into the intelligence world. We are a nation that has prospered uniquely from open, untainted information flows. As I watch the covert contractors get their arms around this topic, it makes me nervous.
An early alarm was sounded last year by Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an article in the Joint Force Quarterly, he wrote: "It is time for us to take a harder look at 'strategic communication.' Frankly, I don't care for the term. . . . It is now sadly something of a cottage industry."
Mullen's critique was amplified this week by a senior military official, who argued that these information operations had become "public affairs on steroids" with what he said was only "limited oversight." He explained: " 'Strategic communication' has an air of respectability to it that propaganda and influence do not. The problem is that it's a slippery slope, because the information environment is so instantaneously global today. . . . You put something out there and it goes worldwide in a flash, making each influence activity suspect to a much wider and more skeptical audience."
Defense Secretary Bob Gates this week ordered a quick, two-week assessment of Pentagon information operations programs. Gates said he "would have concerns" about "contractors collecting intelligence on the battlefield."
There's a gusher of money available to fund these loosely monitored operations. For the current fiscal year, Congress approved a budget of $528 million for information and for psychological-warfare operations (psy-ops). For next fiscal year, the Pentagon budget request is $384 million.
You can get the flavor of these activities by trolling the Internet. You will find an array of contractors offering their expertise in everything from "cultural engagement" to "clandestine operations." It's a world of PowerPoint presentations about how to spread pro-American messages while rebutting and demoralizing the enemy.
A February 2006 report on information operations by the military's joint staff defined the goal as "to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own." An October 2003 Defense Department "Information Operations Roadmap" noted in an appendix that one component could be "Radio/TV/Print/Web media designed to directly modify behavior." This doesn't sound much like Petraeus's frequent and appropriate invocation: "First with the truth."
Problems arise in part because activities are lumped together. Take Afghanistan: Rear Adm. Gregory Smith has a budget of roughly $100 million to support the information operations he commands, which include about $30 million for psy-ops, $30 million for reporting on local "atmospherics," $10 million for public affairs and another $30 million for smaller programs.
Smith told me by telephone from Kabul: "I have tried to bring a more disciplined view of what IO is, and make certain that we do not have activities bleeding into one another." His bosses at the Pentagon need to make sure that these necessary controls are, in fact, in place. This is an area where too much money and too little oversight have produced an information morass.
davidignatius@washpost.com
Wednesday, March 24, 2010; A17
It has become commonplace since Sept. 11, 2001, to speak of the "war of ideas" between Muslim extremists and the West. But there has been too little attention paid to the U.S. military's mobilization for this war, which is often described by the oxymoronic phrase "information operations."
To populate this information "battle space," the military has funded a range of contractors, specialists, training programs and initiatives -- targeted on the hot wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader zone of conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia. Gen. David Petraeus, the Centcom commander who oversees that region, has been one of the military's most vocal proponents of aggressive information operations.
The potential problems were highlighted on March 14, when the New York Times revealed that a Pentagon official from the "strategic communications" realm had funded contractors to gather intelligence in Afghanistan. Last week also brought a report by The Post's Ellen Nakashima that the military, in an offensive information operation, had shut down a jihadist Web site that the CIA had been monitoring for intelligence purposes. In both cases, it seemed the military was wandering into the covert-action arena traditionally reserved for the CIA.
This murky area should be marked with a flashing yellow warning light, meaning: "Slow down!" The United States should be careful about encouraging, in effect, the militarization of information -- and it should be especially cautious when these efforts bleed into the intelligence world. We are a nation that has prospered uniquely from open, untainted information flows. As I watch the covert contractors get their arms around this topic, it makes me nervous.
An early alarm was sounded last year by Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an article in the Joint Force Quarterly, he wrote: "It is time for us to take a harder look at 'strategic communication.' Frankly, I don't care for the term. . . . It is now sadly something of a cottage industry."
Mullen's critique was amplified this week by a senior military official, who argued that these information operations had become "public affairs on steroids" with what he said was only "limited oversight." He explained: " 'Strategic communication' has an air of respectability to it that propaganda and influence do not. The problem is that it's a slippery slope, because the information environment is so instantaneously global today. . . . You put something out there and it goes worldwide in a flash, making each influence activity suspect to a much wider and more skeptical audience."
Defense Secretary Bob Gates this week ordered a quick, two-week assessment of Pentagon information operations programs. Gates said he "would have concerns" about "contractors collecting intelligence on the battlefield."
There's a gusher of money available to fund these loosely monitored operations. For the current fiscal year, Congress approved a budget of $528 million for information and for psychological-warfare operations (psy-ops). For next fiscal year, the Pentagon budget request is $384 million.
You can get the flavor of these activities by trolling the Internet. You will find an array of contractors offering their expertise in everything from "cultural engagement" to "clandestine operations." It's a world of PowerPoint presentations about how to spread pro-American messages while rebutting and demoralizing the enemy.
A February 2006 report on information operations by the military's joint staff defined the goal as "to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own." An October 2003 Defense Department "Information Operations Roadmap" noted in an appendix that one component could be "Radio/TV/Print/Web media designed to directly modify behavior." This doesn't sound much like Petraeus's frequent and appropriate invocation: "First with the truth."
Problems arise in part because activities are lumped together. Take Afghanistan: Rear Adm. Gregory Smith has a budget of roughly $100 million to support the information operations he commands, which include about $30 million for psy-ops, $30 million for reporting on local "atmospherics," $10 million for public affairs and another $30 million for smaller programs.
Smith told me by telephone from Kabul: "I have tried to bring a more disciplined view of what IO is, and make certain that we do not have activities bleeding into one another." His bosses at the Pentagon need to make sure that these necessary controls are, in fact, in place. This is an area where too much money and too little oversight have produced an information morass.
davidignatius@washpost.com
Friday, April 09, 2010
Apple Unveils Mobile Ad System
Mr. Jobs sharply contrasted the market for ads on mobile phones with the way Google has profited on PCs, by running ads on the Web alongside search results. “Search is not where it’s at” on phones, he said. “People are not searching on a mobile device like they are on the desktop.”
Instead, he says, smartphone owners are getting all of their information via apps, so search ads are not as effective.
He said the iAd platform would give developers a way to keep prices for their apps low, or free.
Demonstrating the service, Mr. Jobs clicked on an advertisement for “Toy Story 3” in an application, and was transported to a screen with video, games and offers for theater tickets for the coming Disney film. When he closed the ad, the screen switched back to the application.
“This is not a get-rich-quick scheme for Apple,” Mr. Jobs said. “This is us helping our developers make money so they can survive and keep the prices of their apps reasonable.”
The ads will be seen only on Apple’s products, and it is not clear whether Apple has any ambitions to sell ads on other mobile platforms, like those controlled by Google, Microsoft and Research in Motion.
Mr. Jobs confirmed a bit of Silicon Valley drama by conceding in a question-and-answer session after his presentation that Apple tried to buy the big mobile advertising company, AdMob, but that Google “came in and snatched them from us. They didn’t want us to have them.”
Instead Apple bought a smaller company, Quattro Wireless. But Mr. Jobs said Apple was still “babes in the woods” when it came to advertising.
The iAd system will be part of version 4.0 of the iPhone OS, the software at the core of the iPhone, iPod Touch and iPad. It will also include one much-anticipated feature, the ability to run multiple non-Apple applications at the same time.
Other new features include the ability to give apps as gifts, and a new gaming center that will allow owners of Apple devices to play video games against other people.
The new software will be available for owners of the most recent iPhones and iPod Touches this summer, and for the iPad tablet later in the year. It will not run on the older iPhone 3G.
Woman's body found at Bryan Beach
Beach-goers looking to enjoy Good Friday on Bryan Beach instead spent the afternoon calling 911 and watching the body of a 24-year-old Alvin woman being pulled from a pool of water.
FREEPORT — Beach-goers looking to enjoy Good Friday on Bryan Beach instead spent the afternoon calling 911 and watching the body of a 24-year-old Alvin woman being pulled from a pool of water.
Workers recovered the body of Krystle Renee Bezner from a large washout behind Bryan Beach about 3:30 p.m. Friday, Freeport Police Capt. Gus Flores said.
A spokesman from the Alvin Police Department said Bezner was reported missing about 9:30 p.m. Friday.
A cause of death had not been determined Saturday, but officers are investigating the woman’s death as a homicide, Flores said.
Freeport officers waded into the washout to bring out the woman’s body, he said.
Pct. 1, Place 2 Justice of the Peace Milan Miller pronounced Bezner dead at the scene, Flores said.
“It appears that it is a possible homicide,” Miller said.
Flores would not comment about the woman’s injuries or about how long she might have been dead before her body was found.
The Facts could not locate Bezner’s family Saturday afternoon.
The body has been sent to the Galveston County Medical Examiner’s Office to determine the cause of death, he said.
An examiner’s office spokesman said the cause of death is likely to be determined within the next few weeks.
District Attorney Jeri Yenne has been notified of the case, Flores said.
Friends and acquaintances who saw Bezner in the days before her death should contact the Freeport Police Department at 979-239-1211, Police Chief Tyrone Morrow said.
Katlynn Lanham is a reporter for The Facts. Contact her at 979-237-0150.
FREEPORT — Beach-goers looking to enjoy Good Friday on Bryan Beach instead spent the afternoon calling 911 and watching the body of a 24-year-old Alvin woman being pulled from a pool of water.
Workers recovered the body of Krystle Renee Bezner from a large washout behind Bryan Beach about 3:30 p.m. Friday, Freeport Police Capt. Gus Flores said.
A spokesman from the Alvin Police Department said Bezner was reported missing about 9:30 p.m. Friday.
A cause of death had not been determined Saturday, but officers are investigating the woman’s death as a homicide, Flores said.
Freeport officers waded into the washout to bring out the woman’s body, he said.
Pct. 1, Place 2 Justice of the Peace Milan Miller pronounced Bezner dead at the scene, Flores said.
“It appears that it is a possible homicide,” Miller said.
Flores would not comment about the woman’s injuries or about how long she might have been dead before her body was found.
The Facts could not locate Bezner’s family Saturday afternoon.
The body has been sent to the Galveston County Medical Examiner’s Office to determine the cause of death, he said.
An examiner’s office spokesman said the cause of death is likely to be determined within the next few weeks.
District Attorney Jeri Yenne has been notified of the case, Flores said.
Friends and acquaintances who saw Bezner in the days before her death should contact the Freeport Police Department at 979-239-1211, Police Chief Tyrone Morrow said.
Katlynn Lanham is a reporter for The Facts. Contact her at 979-237-0150.
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